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Prosecuting Public Officials Under the
Hobbs Act: Inducement as an Element of
Extortion Under Color of Official Right
The Hobbs Act has become a major federal weapon against
corruption in state and local government.' A wide variety of state
and local officials-from a city electrical inspector to a gover-
nor-have been convicted of extortion under the Act.2 These offi-
cials have been prosecuted for taking many different kinds of prop-
erty, ranging from cash payments and campaign contributions to
golf vacations and entertainment. 3
By its terms the Act prohibits extortion affecting interstate
commerce, with extortion defined as "the obtaining of property
from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual
or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official
right."' 4 To reach state and local officials, federal prosecutors focus
' Hobbs Act, ch. 645, § 1951, 62 Stat. 793 (1946) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (1982)). See infra notes 4, 8-13 and accompanying text. For a description of how the
Act has been used to fight state and local corruption, see Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local
Corruption: A Case Study in the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEo. L.J. 1171,
1172 (1977). Ruff notes that from 1970 to 1976 federal prosecutions of state and local offi-
cials increased more than 500%, and that "the principal vehicle for this rapidly expanding
federal effort is the Hobbs Act." Id. Between 1970 and 1981 there were 520 federal indict-
ments of allegedly corrupt state officials and 1,757 federal indictments of local officials. See
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE AcTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE PUB-
LIC INTEGRITY SECTION FOR 1981, at 20 (1982). Over the same period, 369 state officials and
1,290 local officials were convicted for corruption under federal law. Id.
2 See United States v. Price, 617 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1979) (city electrical inspector);
United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.) (governor), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976).
1 See United States v. Campo, 744 F.2d 944, 945 (2d Cir. 1984) ($250 cash payment);
United States v. Trotta, 525 F.2d 1096, 1097 (2d Cir. 1975) ($3000 campaign contribution),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976); United States v. O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 697 n.1 (2d Cir.
1984) (en bane) (golf vacations and entertainment).
4 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1982). The Hobbs Act provides, in relevant part:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or at-
tempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person
or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this
section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years,
or both.
(b) As used in this section-
(1) The term "robbery" means the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal
property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means
of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to
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on the last clause of this definition; payments received are charac-
terized as property obtained "under color of official right." Al-
though federal courts agree that the Hobbs Act may be used to
prosecute state and local officials, they do not agree about what act
must be proved for conviction. The majority of the federal courts
of appeals that have addressed the issue hold that officials commit
the requisite act merely by receiving payments not due them under
the law.5 Under this view, the public official need not commit any
act inducing the payment; instead, the official's status and author-
ity are said to exert a coercive force on the party making the pay-
ment. The Second Circuit, in contrast, requires the prosecution to
show that the defendant actually induced the payment. Its test re-
quires that the official must have initiated the transaction and
must at least have subtly encouraged the payments.6
This controversy carries significant implications for federal
prosecutions of state and local officials. If no act of inducement is
required, the range of conduct within the proscription against ex-
tortion will be very broad. Consequently, public officials who con-
tinue the traditional practice of receiving inconsequential gratui-
ties will risk stiff prison terms and fines.' If courts do require an
act of inducement, however, prosecutors must shoulder an addi-
tional burden of proof confounded by the secrecy of the proscribed
transactions and the self-protective refusal of witnesses to testify.
This comment argues that public officials should be convicted
his person or property, or property in his custody or possession, or the person or
property of a relative or member of his family or of anyone in his company at the
time of the taking or obtaining.
(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with
his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear, or under color of official right.
(3) The term "commerce" means commerce within the District of Columbia,
or any Territory or Possession of the United States; all commerce between any
point in a State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and any point
outside thereof; all commerce between points within the same State through any
place outside such State; and all other commerce over which the United States has
jurisdiction.
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)-(b) (1982).
' See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. The word "payments" is used in this
comment to describe any property that may be at issue under the Act, including both cash
payments and in-kind benefits. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1982) (offense involves "the
obtaining of property from another").
6 See United States v. O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 691-92 (2d Cir. 1984) (en banc), dis-
cussed infra notes 47-63 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Paschall, 772
F.2d 68 (4th Cir. 1985), discussed infra note 49.
' The Hobbs Act provides penalties of up to twenty years in prison and a $10,000 fine.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1982).
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of extortion under color of official right only when they actually
induce payments to which they have no legal right. While embrac-
ing the Second Circuit's major conclusion, the comment departs
from it both in the justifications for the inducement requirement
and in the standard for determining what constitutes inducement.
Part I describes current judicial interpretations of the actus reus of
the crime of extortion under color of official right. The description
includes an account of the unusual history of the Hobbs Act as an
"ethics in government" statute. Part II criticizes the emerging ma-
jority view and argues that the Hobbs Act requires an act of in-
ducement. The comment also presents a standard for determining
what acts constitute inducement.
I. CURRENT INTERPRETATIONS
A. Prosecutions of Public Officials Under the Hobbs Act: Teach-
ing an Old Law New Tricks
Although enacted in 1946,8 the Hobbs Act did not assume its
role as an "ethics in government" statute until almost thirty years
later.9 Neither the legislative history of the Hobbs Act nor that of
its predecessor contains a specific reference to the prosecution of
public officials.10 Instead the Act was intended to prohibit certain
labor activities, as a replacement for anti-racketeering provisions
passed in 1934.11 The Supreme Court had held in 1942 that those
provisions did not reach union bullying of farmers.1 Congress en-
acted the Hobbs Act primarily to fill that gap. 13
I Hobbs Act, ch. 645, § 1951, 62. Stat. 793 (1946) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (1982)).
9 The first successful Hobbs Act prosecution for extortion under color of official right
was United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972).
10 See S. REP. No. 1516, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1946) (committee report on the Hobbs
Act); H.R. REP. No. 238, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, 9 (1945) (same); 92 CONG. REc. 7308 (1946)
(Senate passage of Hobbs Act); 91 CONG. REc. 11,899-922 (1945) (House passage of Hobbs
Act); S. REP. No. 532, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1934) (committee report on Anti-Racketeering
Act); H.R. REP. No. 1833, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1934) (same); 78 CONG. REC. 11,482 (1934)
(Senate accepts House amendments to Anti-Racketeering Act); 78 CONG. REc. 11,402-03
(1934) (House passage of Anti-Racketeering Act); 78 CONG. REc. 5734-35 (1934) (Senate pas-
sage of Anti-Racketeering Act).
11 Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979 (repealed 1946). The anti-racketeering
provisions did not use the word extortion to define the proscribed conduct, but instead used
the terminology of the common law offense by stating that any person who "[o]btains the
property of another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of force or fear, or under
color of official right" shall be guilty of a felony. Id. at 980.
" United States v. Local 807, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
13 See, e.g., 91 CONG. REc. 11,900 (1945) (statement of Rep. Hancock) ("[T]his bill is
made necessary by the amazing decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the United
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Several factors laid a foundation for federal prosecutors to use
the Hobbs Act against corrupt state and local officials. 14 First, the
legislative history of the Act, while focusing on labor-related issues,
indicates that anyone can be prosecuted for interfering with inter-
state commerce in ways the Act forbids. 15 Second, the Hobbs Act's
language invites its application to all public officials because it re-
peats the elements of the common law crime of extortion under
color of official right.' e Third, the Supreme Court endorsed an ex-
pansive reading of the Act by reasoning that it "speaks in broad
language, manifesting a purpose to use all the constitutional power
Congress has to punish interference with interstate commerce by
extortion.'1 7 The Act's broad jurisdictional reach allows federal
prosecutions for even minor interferences with interstate
commerce.
18
States against Teamsters' Union 807. . . .That decision. . . legalizes in certain labor dis-
putes the use of robbery and extortion.").
" Several other federal laws are used in prosecutions of state and local officials: (1) The
Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1982), which proscribes interstate travel for the purposes of
extortion or bribery; (2) The Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982), which makes illegal one's engagement in an enterprise
that affects interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity; (3) The Mail
Fraud Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982), which proscribes the use of the mails in schemes to
obtain money fraudulently; (4) The Wire Fraud Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982), which
proscribes the use of telephones or telegraphs in a scheme to defraud; and (5) The Internal
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201-16 (1982), which proscribes attempts to evade federal
taxes and make false statements on returns. For a review of the various federal statutes used
to prosecute state and local officials for corruption, see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRmEs 587-98
(1984); Henderson, The Expanding Role of Federal Prosecutors in Combating State and
Local Political Corruption, 8 Cum. L. REv 385 (1977). Prosecutions of federal officials for
corruption are brought under 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1982). For a description of the various federal
statutes dealing with white collar crime, see Project, Third Annual Survey of White Collar
Crime, 22 AM. CraM. L. REv. 279 (1985).
1 See, e.g., 91 CONG. REc. 11,911 (1945) (statement of Rep. Springer) ("I state that
there is nothing in [the Hobbs Act] which relates to labor. Labor is not mentioned in the
bill. It applies to every American citizen."). That the law does apply to everyone was firmly
established in United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 374-78 (1978).
"' Cf. Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d 182, 193 (8th Cir.) (for the common law of-
fense of extortion, the public official's color of office takes the place of force, threats, and
pressure normally required to prove extortion), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915 (1955).
17 Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960).
Is 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1982). To invoke federal jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act, a
prosecutor need show only a de minimis interference with interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974).
As a practical matter, federal prosecutions were justified by assertions that local prosecutors
were unwilling or unable to prosecute. See J. NOONAN, supra note 14, at 600-01; Stern, Pros-
ecutions of Local Political Corruption Under the Hobbs Act: The Unnecessary Distinction
Between Bribery and Extortion, 3 SEroN HALL L. REV. 1, 1, 6 (1971). This comment will not
delve into the federalism issues raised by legislation such as the Hobbs Act that is passed
pursuant to the commerce clause yet serves a police function.
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With that foundation, federal prosecutors turned the Hobbs
Act against state and local corruption during the 1960s.1e At first
they had trouble prosecuting public officials under the proscription
against extortion by "wrongful use of actual or threatened force,
violence, or fear" because the subtlety and sophistication of cor-
ruption made it difficult to prove that the officials had created du-
ress.20 To get around this difficulty, federal prosecutors began to
bring charges under the alternative proscription of extortion
"under color of official right."
This tack initially appeared no better for prosecutors. Even
prosecutions for extortion "under color of official right" seemed to
require a showing that the official actively coerced the payment.
Some courts believed that the legislative history of the Hobbs Act
required its provisions to be governed by the New York law of ex-
tortion.21 According to New York law, the crimes of extortion and
19 Federal prosecutors have played a leading role in fighting state and local governmen-
tal corruption. See GEORGE AMICK, THE AMERICAN WAY OF GRAFT 223 (1976) ("The most
significant breakthrough in the war on state and local government corruption has been made
by the federal prosecutors. . . .[B]ringing a zeal and sense of righteous outrage to their job,
these new-breed D. A.'s have wrought a revolution in the Newarks and Jersey Citys and
Chicagos and Baltimores and Charlestons of the country."). Several commentators have
speculated on the social forces that spawned the dramatic increase in prosecutions of public
officials. See J. NOONAN, supra note 14, at 598 ("The dynamic movement to prosecute cor-
rupt officials antedated Watergate. The movement, already perceptible under Nixon, was
not markedly partisan ....So steady a development owed its power not as much to indi-
vidual initiative as to the values dominant in the society."). Noonan offers several hypothe-
ses to explain the rise in prosecutions, including diverse sociological and anthropological
theories, but concludes that none is clearly proven by the evidence. Id. at 598-600. Another
commentator argues that corruption represents a discrepancy between the myth of how the
political system works and its real operational code. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, FOLDED LIEs 56-
61 (1979). Crusades against corruption, Reisman states, have the function of reaffirming the
myth system. Id. at 98.
20 See Ruff, supra note 1, at 1177 ("As prosecutors delved deeper into local corruption,
however, they encountered a level of sophistication in the making and receiving of illicit
payments which promised substantial difficulty in establishing the commission of extortion
by duress. ... [There were cases of implicit] understanding[s], difficult of proof, between
contractors and officials concerning the need for payment in exchange for government con-
tracts."); cf. Stern, supra note 18, at 6 ("[Iun the final stages of political corruption a local
official may not even need to solicit the kickback, much less demand it. The practice at that
stage may be so widespead and so well known that everyone contemplating doing business
with that particular governmental body anticipates that he will have to 'take care of the
boys downtown.'") (emphasis in original).
21 See United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 72 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936
(1972); United States v. Kubacki, 237 F. Supp. 638, 641-42 (E.D. Pa. 1965). These decisions
relied on United States v. Nedley, 255 F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1958), which concluded from evi-
dence in the legislative history that New York law was the model for the Hobbs Act. Id. at
355. The legislative history contains considerable evidence that Congress intended to incor-
porate New York law into the Hobbs Act. See, e.g., 91 CONG. REc. 11,900 (1945) (The Hobbs
Act "contains definitions of robbery and extortion which follow the definitions contained in
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Inducement Under the Hobbs Act
bribery were mutually exclusive,2 2 so any crime constituting brib-
ery fell outside the reach of the Hobbs Act. Since the principal
difference between bribery and extortion was that extortion alone
involved duress, officials could defend against Hobbs Act charges
by claiming that the payment was made voluntarily-i.e., that it
was actually a bribe.23 In this situation, the prosecutors faced a
dilemma: without evidence of duress, their only alternative was to
rely on the federal bribery law,24 which was ineffective unless the
official had traveled in interstate commerce in connection with the
bribe, an unlikely circumstance in most corruption cases.2 5
The prosecutors' dilemma was soon resolved. In 1972, the first
conviction for extortion under color of official right was affirmed in
United States v. Kenny. 6 In Kenny, the Third Circuit held that
because the wording of the Hobbs Act's proscription against extor-
tion uses the disjunctive or, the Act permits prosecutions based
solely on the "under color of official right" clause.27 More impor-
tant, the court held that the language of the Hobbs Act embodied
the common law offense of extortion under color of official right,
the laws of the State of New York.") (statement of Rep. Hancock).
This interpretation of the Act was by no means unanimous. For example, in arguing
against the conclusion in Nedley, Stern marshaled four separate arguments. See Stern,
supra note 18, at 2-3, 12-13. First, he argued that the references to New York law were
made to appease representatives from that state who were opposed to the Hobbs Act. Id. at
2-3. Second, he stated that the language of the Act was meant to borrow from the common
law as embodied in state statutes. Id. at 13; see also 91 CONG. REC. 11,910 (1945) (statement
of Rep. Robison) (the definition of extortion is "that followed. . . generally throughout the
Nation, in all the jurisdictions of the various states"). Third, Stern pointed out that it is
unlikely that Congress meant New York law on the mutual exclusivity of extortion and
bribery to be the law of the land because many of the New York cases developing the exclu-
sivity doctrine were decided after the Act was passed. Stern, supra note 18, at 13; cf. United
States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272 (2d Cir.) (modern trend is away from mutual exclusivity of
extortion and bribery), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973); MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4, at 217
(Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980) (same transaction may be both extortion and
bribery). Finally, Stern argued that because the Hobbs Act's language was not identical to
the New York law against extortion, Congress had not intended to copy New York law ex-
actly. Stern, supra note 18, at 12-13.
22 People v. Dioguardi, 8 N.Y.2d 260, 273, 168 N.E.2d 683, 692, 203 N.Y.S.2d 870, 882
(1960) (" 'the essence of bribery is the voluntary giving of something of value to influence
the performance of official duty', whereas the essence of extortion is 'duress' ") (emphasis in
original) (quoting Hornstein v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 22 Misc. 2d 996, 1003, 1006, 37
N.Y.S.2d 404, 412-13, 415 (Sup. Ct. 1942)); see also Addonizio, 451 F.2d at 72; Kubacki, 237
F. Supp. at 641.
23 The defendant in Kubacki successfully proved this defense. See 237 F. Supp. at 641-
42; see also Ruff, supra note 1, at 1184-86; Stern, supra note 18, at 3-8.
", The Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1982), discussed briefly supra note 14.
25 See Stern, supra note 18, at 9-12.
26 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972).
2 Id. at 1229.
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thereby allowing the court to use authorities other than New York
law to interpret the Act.2"
Using common law authorities, the Kenny court said that an
official commits the crime of extortion under color of official right
when he takes property that is not due him.2 9 The court did not
require that the official have committed acts creating fear or du-
ress, but argued instead that the public office itself provides the
coercion.30 The holding thus implied that the crimes of extortion
and bribery could overlap, since even a person "voluntarily" pay-
ing an official could be influenced by the coercive force of the
office.
What the Third Circuit had implied in Kenny, the Seventh
Circuit soon made explicit in United States v. Braasch.31 Noting
that the "use of office to obtain payments is the crux of the statu-
tory requirement of 'under color of official right,'" the Seventh
Circuit held that an official need not falsely claim an official right
to the payment; it was sufficient for conviction that the payment
be made in connection with the official's public capacity.-2 Finally,
laying to rest the issue of the mutual exclusivity of extortion and
bribery, the court declared "[t]hat such conduct may also consti-
tute 'classic bribery' is not a relevant consideration.""
Subsequently, the circuit courts have embraced the holdings
of Kenny and Braasch3 4 The validity of prosecutions based solely
29 Id. The substitution of common law precedents for New York precedents was a two-
fold victory for Herbert J. Stern, the prosecutor in Kenny and author of the article cited
supra note 18. In his article, published before Kenny, Stern argued what he later argued to
the court-that the proper guide to interpreting the Hobbs Act was the common law. See
Stern, supra note 18, passim; supra note 21. But see United States v. Furey, 491 F. Supp.
1048, 1062 (E.D. Pa.) (holding after Kenny that New York law governs intent under the
Hobbs Act), aff'd, 636 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1980).
29 Kenny, 462 F.2d at 1229.
30Id.; see also United States v. Sutter, 160 F.2d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1947) (The common
law offense of extortion under color of official right did not conform to the "ordinary mean-
ing and understanding" of extortion, which requires some form of threat or duress. Instead,
"color of public office took the place of. . .force, threats, or pressure.") (dictum).
" 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
32 Id. at 151.
22 Id. (footnote omitted).
34 See, e.g., United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 393 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 819 (1976); United States v. Trotta, 525 F.2d 1096, 1100 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 971 (1976); United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 644-45 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975); United States v. Price, 507 F.2d 1349, 1350 (4th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Williams, 621 F.2d 123, 124-25 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919
(1981); United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299, 302-07 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1062 (1978); United States v. Price, 617 F.2d 455, 457 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 371-72 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. McClelland, 731 F.2d 1438,
1439-40 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2708 (1985); United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d
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on the "under color of official right" clause is now firmly estab-
lished. The controlling force of the common law for interpretation
and the overlap of the crimes of extortion and bribery are also ac-
cepted.,35 The result is that a long-dormant clause in the Hobbs
Act has become a potent weapon for fighting corruption in state
and local government.
However, a crucial question about the actus reus of extortion
under color of official right remains to be answered: must an offi-
cial induce payments, or is it sufficient merely to accept property
not due him? Phrased another way, does an official commit extor-
tion every time he accepts a bribe, or only when he has somehow
induced the bribe?
B. The Emerging Majority View
A majority of the circuit courts that have considered the issue
hold that an official commits extortion under color of official right
by merely accepting or receiving property not due him. 6 Under
this view, the public official need not induce the payments or initi-
ate the transaction. 7 The mere acceptance of an unsolicited bribe
313, 320-21 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976); United States v. Swift, 732 F.2d
878, 880 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 905 (1985). The D.C. Circuit has not
addressed this issue because prosecutions of public officials in the District of Columbia, like
prosecutions of federal officials, fall under the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201
(1982).
35 See, e.g., United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1195 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299, 304-05 (6th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978); cf. United States v. O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 686-87 (2d
Cir. 1984) (en banc) (rejecting an argument that some form of duress is required, thus effec-
tively holding that some transactions can be both extortion and bribery).
3' The courts are unanimous about the other two elements of the crime:
(1) The public official must intend to do the act constituting the crime. See, e.g., United
States v. Warledo, 557 F.2d 721, 729 n.3 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Green, 246 F.2d
155, 159-60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 871 (1957); United States v. Furey, 491 F.
Supp. 1048, 1061-62 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd 636 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1980); cf. United States v.
Scacchetti, 668 F.2d 643, 649 (2d Cir.) (requiring an intent to obtain property by the use of
the power and authority of public office), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1132 (1982); United States
v. Sweeney, 262 F.2d 272, 275 n.3 (3d Cir. 1959) (requiring criminal intent).
(2) The party making the payment must be motivated by a reasonable belief in the
official's power. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 372 (8th Cir. 1976). The
public official need not have actual authority over the affairs of concern to the party making
the payment; there need only be a reasonable belief that such influence exists. See, e.g.,
United States v. Meyers, 529 F.2d 1033, 1037 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976);
United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 643-44 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1014 (1975); see also United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 151 (7th Cir. 1974) ("So long
as the motivation for the payment focuses on the recipient's office, the conduct falls within
the ambit of [the Hobbs Act]."), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
37 See United States v. Swift, 732 F.2d 878, 880 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
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constitutes extortion under color of official right.3 8
The circuit courts offer two major reasons for this holding.
First, building on Kenny's use of the common law to interpret the
Hobbs Act, the courts give a very expansive reading to the com-
mon law offense of extortion under color of official right." Black-
stone defined the common law offense as "an abuse of public jus-
tice, which consists in any officer's unlawfully taking, by colour of
his office, from any man, any money or thing of value that is not
due to him. ' 40 The Supreme Court has explicitly followed Black-
stone's statement of the common law offense, except that the
Court's reading substitutes the verb obtain for take.41 The lower
courts that do not require inducement define the terms take and
obtain as synonyms of receive and accept.4 2 Their view of the com-
mon law offense thus includes even the passive acceptance of a
bribe.
Second, the courts not requiring inducement support their
holding by referring to the opinion in Braasch.43 There the Sev-
enth Circuit stated:
It matters not whether the public official induces payments to
perform his duties or not to perform his duties, or even, as
here, to perform or not to perform acts unrelated to his duties
which can only be undertaken because of his official position.
So long as the motivation for the payment focuses on the re-
cipient's office, the conduct falls within the ambit of [the
Hobbs Act].44
The courts apparently read the first sentence as doing away with
905 (1985); United States v. McClelland, 731 F.2d 1438, 1439-40 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 105 S. Ct. 2708 (1985); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 594-96 (3d Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982), and cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 243 (1984); United
States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1195 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981);
United States v. Butler, 618 F.2d 411, 417-18 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 927 (1980),
and cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1089 (1981). One other circuit has explicitly reserved the ques-
tion. See United States v. Jarabek, 726 F.2d 889, 904 n.16 (1st Cir. 1984).
38 See, e.g., Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 594-95; cf. Butler, 618 F.2d at 417-18 ("a showing
that the motivation for the payment focuses on the recipient's office, regardless of who in-
duces the payments, is sufficient to convict under the Hobbs Act").
39 See, e.g., Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 594-95; Butler, 618 F.2d at 418.
40 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *141, quoted in Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 595.
41 See United States v. Nardeflo, 393 U.S. 286, 289 (1969).
42 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 38.
43 See, e.g., McClelland, 731 F.2d at 1439; Hedman, 630 F.2d at 1195; Butler, 618 F.2d
at 420; cf. O'Grady, 742 F.2d at 689 (Braasch "explicitly rejected the notion that proof of
inducement is necessary").
44 Braasch, 505 F.2d at 151.
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the requirement of inducement, and the second as placing the fo-
cus of a trial on the motive of the payor, not of the official.45
The net result of this reading of the Act is that an official need
not perform an act of inducement in order to commit extortion
under color of official right. The official need only receive a pay-
ment, and the payor may initiate the transaction. In essence, the
actus reus of committing extortion becomes indistinguishable from
the actus reus of receiving a bribe; the Hobbs Act becomes the fed-
eral law against extortion and bribery.46
C. The Minority View
The first major deviation from the trend to ever broader inter-
pretation of the crime of extortion under color of official right
came in the Second Circuit's en banc decision in United States v.
O'Grady.47 There the court held that it is not extortion "when a
public official merely accepts unsolicited benefits knowing that
they were given because of his public office." '48 Instead, the official
must actually do something to induce the payments.49 The court
also required that the extortion "begin[] with the public official,
not with the gratuitous actions of another." 50
The court offered two reasons for holding that an act of in-
"5 A better reading of this passage would be that the nature of the act to be performed
by the official in exchange for payment is irrelevant as long as the official uses the office to
motivate or coerce the payment. Under this reading, the inquiry focuses on whether, not
how, the official has used the office to induce payment. See infra note 86.
46 See J. NooNA, supra note 14, at 584-87 (the Hobbs Act extortion decisions, begin-
ning with Kenny and Braasch, led to the equation of extortion and bribery, converting the
Hobbs Act into a bribery statute and effectively federalizing the law of bribery).
4 742 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1984) (en banc).
48 Id. at 684.
41 Id. at 687. In United States v. Paschall, 772 F.2d 68 (4th Cir. 1985), the Fourth
Circuit appeared to follow O'Grady by holding that inducement was required, then essen-
tially followed the majority by defining inducement so broadly as to make the requirement
almost meaningless. The court observed that the requirement of inducement "springs di-
rectly from the statutory definition of extortion." Id. at 72. However, Paschall then held
that officials' positions themselves were "invitations to seek [the officials'] goodwill by ex-
tending to them substantial favors which were not their due." Id. at 73. The court thus
criminalized every case where an official receives a gift not due him, except where the gifts
have less than "substantial value." Id. But see infra note 55 (arguing against this
conclusion).
In another case decided after O'Grady, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its position in
United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981),
that inducement is not required to prove extortion under color of official right under the
Hobbs Act. United States v. Schmidt, 760 F.2d 828, 832-33 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 86 (1985).
50 O'Grady, 742 F.2d at 691.
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ducement is essential to a Hobbs Act prosecution. First, the court
believed that Congress's enactment of a separate statute forbid-
ding federal officials to accept gratuities51 was "a clear indication
that Congress did not believe that the Hobbs Act prohibits such
conduct. ' 52 The court reinforced its interpretation by noting that
the federal gratuities law provided lower penalties than those in
the Hobbs Act.53
Second, the court found that a requirement of inducement was
necessary to protect public officials from what otherwise is an over-
broad statute. The court asserted that without the requirement of
inducement the Hobbs Act would be in effect a "professional eth-
ics standard" that imposes on officials a duty never to accept gra-
tuities.5 4 The court thought it unwise to equate extortion with lob-
bying efforts to "persuade, cajole or appease" public officials by
giving small gratuities.5 5 Such an equation would place "every pub-
lic official in jeopardy by virtue of his status rather than his venal
acts. ' 56 The court also observed that an inducement requirement
was necessary to prevent an impermissible degree of prosecutorial
discretion. Without the requirement, the Hobbs Act "raises serious
constitutional questions of fair notice and overbreadth and makes
a mockery of the principle that criminal statutes must be con-
strued strictly with any ambiguity resolved in favor of lenity. ' 57
51 18 U.S.C. § 201(g) (1982).
52 O'Grady, 742 F.2d at 691. However, the dissenting opinion rebuts this argument by
suggesting that the existence of overlapping statutes is "the inevitable product of piece-meal
additions to the Code over the last 150 years," and is not a clear indicator of congressional
intent. Id. at 707-08 (Mansfield, J., dissenting); cf. supra note 14 (discussing federal statutes
that also overlap).
53 742 F.2d at 691. The argument based on different penalties is weak. The Hobbs Act
had high penalties to provide appropriate punishment for the range of offenses proscribed,
which included forcible extortion and violent robbery. Id. at 708 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
However, judges are not obligated to impose the maximum penalty;, they can give a smaller
penalty where a person is convicted of extortion equivalent to bribery under the Hobbs Act.
54 Id. at 687 (majority opinion).
"' Id. at 693. There is no statutory reason to exclude small payments from the reach of
the law. The Hobbs Act proscribes interference with interstate commerce "in any way or
degree," 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1982), thus indicating that even small payments fall within its
reach. This is the major flaw in Judge Mansfield's suggested interpretation of the Act in
O'Grady, 742 F.2d at 708-09 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (arguing that culpability should
hinge on the size of the payment).
16 742 F.2d at 693 (majority opinion); cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666
(1962) (overturning laws criminalizing narcotics addiction on the ground that they punish a
status rather than an act). The court's statement that the Hobbs Act would create a "status
offense" is not an accurate characterization of the majority view. An official would be jeop-
ardized by his status only if the receipt of gratuities were an inherent aspect of being a
public official.
17 742 F.2d at 694. The court's allusions to the constitutional doctrines of vagueness
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The court then set forth some guidelines for determining what
constitutes inducement under the Hobbs Act. First, the court sub-
scribed to a general definition of "induce": "to move and lead (as
by persuasion or influence)."8 Second, the court stated that the
official must initiate the transaction.59 Third, the court indicated
that although the official must do something to induce the pay-
ments, there is no requirement that the official grant or carry out
favors: no quid pro quo is necessary.6 0 Finally, the court stated
that the requisite act of inducement could take the form of words
or deeds and could be quite subtle, as long as the act creates the
impression that payments are expected.' Judge Pierce suggested
in his concurring opinion that a pattern of receiving payments
could "constitute a communicative act" from which inducement
might be inferred. 2
II. THE REQUISITE ACT OF INDUCEMENT
A close reading of the Hobbs Act shows that the Second Cir-
cuit's conclusion is correct: to commit extortion under color of offi-
cial right an official must somehow affirmatively induce a payment
not due him. However, inducement should be defined to include all
acts that create an expectation of payment, both subtle and bla-
tant, regardless of whether the official originally took the initiative.
and overbreadth can be criticized. As to vagueness, the law as other circuits have inter-
preted it is not vague. It provides a very clear guide to conduct. As O'Grady itself states, the
interpretation imposes an affirmative obligation not to accept any gifts. Id. at 687. In addi-
tion, the court's reference to overbreadth appears inappropriate. Courts usually refer to
overbreadth as a constitutional matter only when a law implicates first amendment inter-
ests. See LAURENcE TRBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-24, at 711 (1978) ("A plausi-
ble challenge to a law as void for overbreadth can be made only when (1) the protected
activity is a significant part of the law's target, and (2) there exists no satisfactory way of
severing the law's constitutional from its unconstitutional applications so as to excise the
latter clearly in a single step from the law's reach.") (emphasis in original). O'Grady does
not discuss first amendment implications, but the Hobbs Act arguably survives the first part
of Tribe's test because no protected activity is a significant part of the law's target. But see
infra note 103.
" O'Grady, 742 F.2d at 688 n.8 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY 1154 (1961)).
59 742 F.2d at 691.
60 Id. at 688-89.
61 Id. at 691-92.
12 Id. at 694 (Pierce, J., concurring). Although this concurrence received the votes of
the majority of the en banc panel, three judges who did not favor the pattern-of-receipt
theory voted for it solely out of concern for sound judicial administration; they felt it impor-
tant to have a majority direction to the trial court for composing jury instructions at the
new trial. The panel had previously been divided five to five on the issue. Id. at 694-95
(Newman, J., concurring).
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This approach properly restores the prosecutor's burden of demon-
strating a culpable act, but does not allow that burden to immu-
nize conduct that Congress intended the Hobbs Act to reach.
A. The Case for Requiring an Act of Inducement
Several considerations are relevant to interpreting the Hobbs
Act: (1) the plain meaning of the statute; (2) congressional intent,
as revealed by the purpose of the Act and its historical sources; (3)
the principle of fair notice, which requires that ambiguous criminal
statutes be strictly construed in favor of the defendant; and (4) the
effect of any interpretation on prosecutorial discretion.
1. Statutory Language. The Hobbs Act defines extortion as
"the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced
by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or
under color of official right."6 According to traditional methods of
statutory interpretation, this definition should be read both in ref-
erence to the plain meaning of the words64 and in such a way as to
give effect to all the words of the statute. 5
The plain meaning of obtaining indicates that the Hobbs Act
requires an act by a public official designed to encourage a pay-
ment. The verb obtain suggests action by the obtainor-in this
case, effort by the official to procure money not due him. Black's
Law Dictionary defines obtain as "[t]o get hold of by effort; to get
possession of; to procure; to acquire, in any way. ' '16 The first
phrase in the definition explicitly requires effort by the obtainor.
The other aspects of the definition, especially the references to
procure and acquire, reinforce that requirement. Procure, for in-
stance, means "[t]o initiate a proceeding; to cause a thing to be
done; to instigate; to contrive, bring about, effect, or cause."61 Ac-
quire generally means "[t]o gain by any means, usually by one's
own exertions."6 s
Furthermore, Congress used obtaining elsewhere in the Hobbs
Act in a context that clearly denotes effort to get property. The
,3 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
" See, e.g., Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577,
580 (1982); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 187 (1980); W. LAFAvE &
A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW, § 10, at 70 (1972).
" See, e.g., United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955).
's BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 972 (5th ed. 1979).
7 Id. at 1087.
" Id. at 23. Corpus Juris Secundum also states that "the great weight of authority of
lexicographers is to the effect that the strict and primary acceptation of the word 'obtain' is
to acquire by one's own efforts." 67 C.J.S. Obtain (1978).
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sentence immediately preceding the definition of extortion defines
robbery as "the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property"
against the will of another.69 Robbery cannot be conceived of as
the passive acceptance of property. If Congress meant the words
taking and obtaining to include passive acceptance, it would not
have used those words to define such an active offense. Since it
also seems natural to define the same words in the same way from
sentence to sentence, no passive connotation should be given to
taking and obtaining in the extortion section.
The grammatical structure of the Act also reinforces this read-
ing. The word or functions in one of two ways in the definition of
extortion. Courts holding that no inducement is necessary see or as
creating a construct in which the preposition under parallels the
verb induced: "'extortion' means the obtaining of property from
another, with his consent, . . . under color of official right. ' 70 Al-
ternatively, courts requiring inducement read or as creating a con-
struct in which the preposition under parallels the preposition by:
"'extortion' means the obtaining of property from another, with
his consent, induced . . . under color of official right." 1
While the first reading could be forced upon the statutory lan-
6- 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1) (1982) (emphasis added). This section reads in full:
The term "robbery" means the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from
the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or
threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or
property, or property in his custody or possession, or the person or property of a rela-
tive or member of his family or of anyone in his company at the time of the taking or
obtaining.
Id.
Similarly, in Blackstone's definitions both of bribery and of extortion the crucial verb is
take. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at *139 (bribery); id. at *141 (extortion). But
Blackstone also uses the verb take in his definition of robbery. Id. at *241 ("There must be
a taking, otherwise it is no robbery.").
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1982). One court edits the statute in exactly this manner. See
United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 594 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982),
and cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 243 (1984); see also O'Grady, 742 F.2d at 697 (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting).
7, Significantly, commentary produced by the Justice Department appears to support
this grammatical construction of the statute. See U.S. DEP'T oF JUSTICE, UNrrED STATES AT-
TORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-131.180 (1984) ("[T]here is some question as to whether the Hobbs
Act defines this type of extortion as 'the obtaining of property from another under color of
official right,' or as 'the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced under
color of official right.' . . . [T]he grammatical structure of the Hobbs Act would appear to
support the latter language."). The Fourth Circuit also adopted this reading of the statute
in United States v. Paschall, 772 F.2d 68, 71 (4th Cir. 1985), discussed supra note 49.
A third possible reading would parallel under and with: "'extortion' means the ob-
taining of property from another . . . under color of official right." This reading is extremely
unnatural, however, since it would edit out the important phrase, "with his consent."
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guage, only the second comports with standard American usage. As
a coordinating conjunction, or is properly used to coordinate-that"
is, to create parallels among-two or more grammatically
equivalent words, phrases, or clauses.72 For example, the first or in
the Hobbs Act's definition of extortion coordinates (or creates a
parallel between) two adjectives, actual and threatened. The sec-
ond or coordinates three nouns, force, violence, and fear. In accor-
dance with both reason and standard usage, the third or should be
understood to coordinate the prepositional phrase beginning with
under and another prepositional phrase. The second reading does
coordinate the last prepositional phrase, "under color of official
right," and the second to last prepositional phrase, "by wrongful
use of." Also, under the second reading both phrases have a paral-
lel function with respect to induced. In contrast, the first reading
coordinates a verb, induced, and a preposition, under. The first
reading has the additional irregularity of reading under as a prepo-
sition of obtaining, which is the verb form (gerund) farther from it
than is the verb induced, a problem that does not arise with the
second reading.
Ironically, the second reading finds some support in the very
cases relied upon by courts that do not require inducement. In
United States v. Kenny,7 3 the court approved a jury instruction
that the payment could be "induced either by" fear or under color
of official right.74 The instruction's use of the correlative conjunc-
tion either. . . or parallels the use of the coordinating conjunction
or as interpreted by the courts requiring inducement. In United
States v. Braasch,7 5 the court stated that "coercive extortion is not
the only type [of extortion] outlawed by the Act. The other is in-
ducing payoffs 'under color of official right' . . . ."' Braasch's
statement is similar to the second reading of the statute; both read
"under color of official right" as a prepositional phrase relating to
72 See D. EBBITT & W. EBBrrT, INDEX TO ENGLISH 78 (7th ed. 1982); B. EVANS & C.
EVANS, A DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN USAGE 112-13 (1957).
73 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972).
74 Id. at 1229.
75 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
76 Id. at 151 n.8 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Paschall, 772 F.2d 68 (4th
Cir. 1985), discussed supra note 49; United States v. Adcock, 558 F.2d 397, 403 (8th Cir.
1977) ("The government must establish that the defendant induced the victim to part with
his money or property and that the defendant did so by extortion."); United States v.
Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 394 (1st Cir. 1976) ("inducement had to come from the official");
United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875, 877 (7th Cir. 1974) ("the obtaining of property
from another, with his consent, induced ... under color of official right"), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975).
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induced instead of to obtaining.
In light of these considerations, the language of the Hobbs Act
should be read to proscribe only payments made after an act of
inducement.77 The plain meaning of obtaining implies effort by the
obtainor. In addition, the last or coordinates the prepositions by
and under, leaving induced in the definition of extortion under
color of official right. While the plain meaning of obtaining and the
logical function of the last or each show independently that the
Hobbs Act requires an official to induce payments to commit ex-
tortion under color of official right, the presence of both in the
statutory definition of extortion under color of official right is as
clear an indication of that requirement as one might hope to find
in a statute.
2. Congressional Intent. The language of the Hobbs Act is
clear about inducement precisely because Congress intended it to
be an essential element of extortion. Although the legislative his-
tory of the Act sheds little light on the matter, the underlying in-
tent manifests itself in the common law definition that the statute
adopts, as well as in the historical context of the Act's passage.
The Hobbs Act adopts the elements of the common law of-
fense of extortion, which typically required inducement. The lan-
guage employed in the Hobbs Act mirrors the usual definitions of
the common law offense. Authorities on the common law defined
extortion as a public official taking, by color of office, payments not
due him.78 The fact that Congress borrowed common law terms
means that it "adopted the cluster of ideas that were attached to
7 Some contend that requiring inducement to prove extortion under color of official
right would make the crime indistinguishable from extortion induced by fear or violence,
rendering the "under color of official right" language surplusage. See United States v. Cer-
illi, 603 F.2d 415, 425 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980). This view, however,
assumes erroneously that there cannot be inducement without acts of actual or threatened
force, violence, or fear. Certainly acts communicating encouragement to a prospective donor
need not instill fear or amount to threats. See Note, Extortion "Under Color of Official
Right": Federal Prosecution of Official Corruption under the Hobbs Act, 5 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
513, 532 (1974) ("Common sense would dictate that some act on the part of the official
apprising the victim of his desire to obtain money is probably the way such extortions would
take place. This action by the official, however, does not have to rise to the level of a direct
threat or overt coercion if done under color of official right.").
78 See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at *141; 35 C.J.S. Extortion § 1 (1960). The
common law requirement that the payments must be "not due" the official is not discussed
much in the cases. Presumably, an official must take payments not allowed by law. The
relevant body of law would seem to be state and local law, since the offices are created by
state and local law. Therefore, payments must be "not due" the official under state and local
statutes regulating public offices. Thus, if a defendant could show that state and local law
allowed the payment in question, the payment would be due him, and he would be
acquitted.
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each borrowed word . . . unless otherwise instructed. '79 Indeed,
the legislative history shows that Congress was well aware of the
origin of the language it used.80 It is reasonable, then, to attribute
to Congress the intention to subsume within the Hobbs Act the
elements of common law extortion, even in the absence of other
clear statements of purpose to that effect.8"
Since the common law provides a guide to congressional in-
tent, the relevant inquiry is whether inducement was an element of
the common law offense of extortion under color of official right.
The major cases explicitly applying the common law definition
typically involved acts of inducement by the official. Those acts
included, for example, a deputy collector of internal revenue's de-
mand for additional tax money that he falsely said was due the
government, and a borough attorney's demand for fifteen thousand
dollars in exchange for his influence in getting a zoning ordinance
passed. 2 As one court stated in rejecting a charge of extortion:
It is clear that neither the evidence nor the indictment in the
case at bar presents a charge of extortion. [Another person]
took the initiative, and was the active proponent of all that
was done. All that [the defendant] did was to assent ostensi-
bly to [the other person's] offer, and receive the money. 3
79 Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952); see also W. LAFAvE & A.
ScoTr, supra note 64, § 10, at 73-74.
8o See 91 CONG. REc. 11,910 (1945) (statements of Rep. Robison and Rep. Springer); id.
at 11,906 (statement of Rep. Robison); id. at 11,912 (statement of Rep. Hobbs) ("Those
words [robbery and extortion] have been construed a thousand times by the courts. Every-
body knows what they mean."); id. at 11,914 (statement of Rep. Russell) ("Wherever juris-
prudence has had its sway robbery and extortion have been defined. There is no use defin-
ing those terms because they are so well defined that their definition now is a matter of
common knowledge.").
81 In United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972),
discussed supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text, the court accepted the significance of
the common law offense for interpretation, but did not explain why it chose that interpreta-
tive guide, except to say that the wording of the Hobbs Act repeats the common law offense.
Id. at 1229.
82 See United States v. Altmeyer, 113 F. Supp. 854, 856 (W.D. Pa. 1953) (deputy collec-
tor of internal revenue); State v. Weleck, 10 N.J. 355, 370-73, 91 A.2d 751, 758-60 (1952)
(borough attorney).
83 Daniels v. United States, 17 F.2d 339, 342 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 744
(1927). The Supreme Court's formulation of the common law offense of extortion utilizes
the verb obtain, which connotes an active element. See United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S.
286, 289 (1969); supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
In contrast, Ruff views the common law offense as requiring more than inducement.
Ruff contends that the theory in United States v. Sutter, 160 F.2d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1947)
cited in Kenny, 462 F.2d at 1229, that color of official right takes the place of the use of
force, threats, or pressure under the common law offense is an "explanation wholly at odds
with the true common -law origins of the offense." Ruff, supra note 1, at 1182. But Ruff
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In addition, although the language used in the common law
authorities might allow some overlap between the crimes of extor-
tion and bribery, the two traditionally have been treated as sepa-
rate offenses.84 The historic separation of the offenses implies that
extortion and receipt of a bribe are not identical. "The distinction
between bribery and extortion seems to be that the former offense
consists in offering a present or receiving one, the latter in de-
manding a fee or present by color of office."'85 Requiring induce-
ment as an element of extortion under color of official right would
preserve this distinction between bribery and extortion; the passive
acceptance of payments by a public official would be considered
bribery, but not extortion. 6
A final guide to the meaning of the common law offense is its
historical context. The offense arose during times when public offi-
cials made their living largely by collecting fees from citizens.
offers no proof that the common law offense requires force, threats, or duress. Id. at 1179-81
(discussing common law offense). Moreover, Ruffs theory, if accepted, would render the
entire "under color of official right" clause meaningless, since force, threats, or pressure
would have to be proven in order to convict an official. Oddly, Ruff himself makes this
point:
If one adopts the usual course and attempts to give meaning to all the statutory lan-
guage, it is hard to challenge the result reached by the courts. Although it could be
argued that the words "under color of official right" suggest one means of establishing
the use of fear, this reading would reduce the words to surplusage ....
Id. at 1197.
84 See J. NOONAN, supra note 14, at 585-86; 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at *141
(extortion); id. at *139 (bribery).
85 State v. Pritchard, 107 N.C. 921, 929, 12 S.E. 50, 52 (1890) (emphasis added).
88 This is consistent with the position taken by the Model Penal Code, which states:
"[T]he same transaction may well constitute both [extortion and bribery]. The difference
between the two offenses is that extortion requires an element of intimidation that need not
be present in the case of bribery." MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4, at 217 (Official Draft &
Revised Comments 1980) (footnote omitted). Of course, if the office automatically supplies
this element of intimidation, there would be no difference between the crimes. See United
States v. Paschall, 772 F.2d 68 (4th Cir. 1985), discussed supra note 49.
Nothing in Kenny or Braasch is inconsistent with this position. Both cases involved
clear acts of inducement, so neither case reached the issue of whether inducement is re-
quired. See United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (3d Cir.) (extortion from con-
struction contractors involving demands), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972); United States v.
Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 142 (7th Cir. 1974) (shakedowns by police of local businesses), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975). And neither decision suggests that an act of inducement should
not be required. The much quoted passage from the Braasch opinion, which is read as say-
ing that inducement should not be required, see supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text,
has been misconstrued. The passage does not say that inducement is unnecessary; it says
instead that the way the official induces payments is irrelevant as long as the office is the
motivation for the payments. And the further statement in Braasch that conduct constitut-
ing extortion may also amount to bribery certainly does not mean that all conduct cogniza-
ble as bribery will also be extortion. That there is some overlap between extortion and brib-
ery does not eliminate the distinction between the two crimes.
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Often those collections were regular and legal events. In this con-
text, extortion under color of official right was an offense intended
to prevent officials from taking fees to which they had no legal en-
titlement. In this way it was aimed at officials who abused the col-
lection process and not at officials who passively accepted
gratuities.8 7
This interpretation is also consistent with Congress's aims in
passing the Hobbs Act. Congress was most concerned about active
coercion by labor union members. The legislative history is replete
with accounts of union members stopping farm produce trucks to
coerce farmers into making payments to the union. 8 Acts of rob-
bery and extortion involving violence were the primary concern of
the legislators."' Thus, Congress was concerned exclusively with ex-
tortion of an active nature. So even if one could somehow ignore
the inducement requirement that carried over from the common
law offense of extortion under color of official right, the kind of
actions Congress meant to target strongly suggests the same inter-
pretation of the "under color of official right" clause.
3. The Principle of Fair Notice. One of the traditional pro-
tections for the accused in the American criminal justice system is
the practice of construing criminal statutes so as to give the fairest
possible notice of what acts they prohibit.90 The canon of interpre-
tation which implements this policy states that criminal statutes
87 See State v. Begyn, 34 N.J. 35, 46, 167 A.2d 161, 166 (1961) (purpose of the common
law offense was "simply to penalize the officer who non-innocently insisted on a larger fee
than he was entitled to or a fee where none was permitted or required"); R PERKINS & R.
BoYcE, CRIMINAL LAW 443 (3d ed. 1982) ("Common-law extortion is the corrupt collection of
an unlawful fee by an officer under color of office .... ").
8 See 91 CoNG. Rzc. 11,902 (statement of Rep. Walter); id. at 11,903 (statement of Rep.
Gwynne); id. at 11,904 (statement of Rep. Anderson); id. at 11,905-06 (statement of Rep.
Robison); id. at 11,907 (statement of Rep. Fellows); id. at 11,908 (statement of Rep. Vur-
sell); id. at 11,911 (statement of Rep. Jennings); id. at 11,917 (statement of Rep. Rivers).
89 See id. at 11,913 (statement of Rep. Whittington) ("The bill is to prevent a repeti-
tion of the physical violences by members of labor unions. . . . It pronounces the acts of
those who assault and extort from the operators of trucks engaged in legitimate interstate
commerce crimes with penalties.").
9o See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 64, § 10, at 72 (in analyzing the issue of fair
notice, the emphasis is on the wording of the statute); id. at 74 (when the content of lan-
guage from the common law has a clear meaning, courts will consider the common law when
analyzing notice). Certain elements of the common law offense of extortion are sufficiently
vague that the issue of fair notice is not resolved by resort to the common law. See United
States v. O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 695 (2d Cir. 1984) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring and
dissenting) ("As is apparent from disparate judicial interpretations, the phrase 'under color
of official right', standing alone, is vague almost to the point of unconstitutionality."). But
see United States v. Trotta, 525 F.2d 1096, 1098 n.6 (2d Cir. 1975) (the term "under color of
official right" is a legal term of art like the word "obscene"), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971
(1976).
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should be strictly construed in favor of lenity to the defendant.91
To the extent that the Hobbs Act proscription admits of more
than one meaning, construing the law to require an act of induce-
ment is more lenient to the defendant since it adds to the burden
of the prosecution. Public officials should not be made to suffer
under the strictest possible reading of the Act if its language might
be seen as ambiguous.
Of course, leniency has its costs. If prosecutors must prove an
act of inducement, fewer culpable officials might be prosecuted
under the Act.9 2 And to allow the defendant to deny any actual
inducement of the payments could bring about the anomalous situ-
ation feared by federal prosecutors: an extortion charge could be
defended by proof that the transaction was really a bribe.93
But these fears are both inappropriate and exaggerated. First
of all, the prosecutors' argument amounts to nothing more than a
denial of the widely accepted principle of fair notice. The very ex-
istence of this principle makes plain that a fair criminal process is
more important than high conviction rates. To favor leniency
places Congress, and not courts or prosecutors, in the position of
deciding the appropriate reach of criminal statutes. If reading the
" See United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 665 (3d Cir.) (Gibbons, J., dissenting)
(canon of interpretation dictating leniency is rooted in the principle of adequate notice),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975); W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 64, § 10, at 72-73.
92 Compare this problem of proof to the problems discussed supra notes 20-25 and ac-
companying text. It is difficult to determine which outcomes of past successful prosecutions
for extortion under color of official right would be changed by requiring proof of an act of
inducement. Most cases affirming convictions involve some facts suggesting inducement. See
O'Grady, 742 F.2d at 689, and cases cited therein. However, there is doubt about whether
the evidence of inducement would have been sufficient to convict if inducement were explic-
itly required. In his dissent in O'Grady, Judge Mansfield noted:
If inducement clearly existed in those cases, no purpose would have been served by the
flat, unequivocal and repeated pronouncements by these other circuits and even by
ourselves to the effect that further proof of inducement is unnecessary as long as the
benefits were bestowed upon the official because of his public office. . . . Had any of
those courts construed the statute as it has been interpreted by the majority here they
would have reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Id. at 706 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
,3 See Stern, supra note 18, at 2, 4, 7-8 (discussing the defense of bribery to a charge of
extortion). The logic behind the opposition to this defense of bribery is that the defendant
may escape simply because he was mischarged. But if extortion requires inducement, failure
to prove that element should result in acquittal of extortion even if the defendant's actions
clearly amount to some other crime. By analogy, a defendant who rebuts a first-degree mur-
der charge by proving there was no premeditation should be acquitted of the charge. In
doing this, however, the defendant may well have shown that the crime in fact was man-
slaughter. The mischarging problem can be solved through multiple charges. If it is difficult
to use multiple charges because of the jurisdictional bases of the Hobbs Act and the Travel
Act, see supra note 14 and text accompanying note 25, that is hardly a reason to deny the
defendant the opportunity to negate an element of the offense.
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Hobbs Act strictly in favor of defendants-and in light of its lan-
guage and history-would allow conduct Congress wants to pro-
hibit, then the Act should be amended. 4 Under vague statutes the
benefit of the doubt belongs to the defendant and not to con-
stantly changing notions of the efficient level of prosecution.
There is also no reason to believe that the additional burden
on the prosecution will be unreasonable if inducement is required.
Additional acquittals will result only where there is no proof that
the official encouraged the payments in some way. Cases involving
a pattern of receiving benefits, which were a major concern of
those opposed to the defense of bribery,95 would still violate the
Act, since inducement could be inferred from the pattern of re-
ceipt.9 6 Defined in this way, an inducement requirement reasona-
bly accommodates both the principle of fair notice and the interest
in prosecuting government officials who betray the public trust.
4. Reducing Prosecutorial Discretion. Without a requirement
of inducement, extortion under color of official right is an ex-
tremely broad offense, bringing a great deal of potentially unobjec-
tionable conduct within the ambit of the Hobbs Act and reaching
even the passive receipt of small gratuities by public officials. For
example, public officials often receive benefits such as lunches or
tickets to sporting events which are designed to "persuade, cajole
or appease them."98 Officials in non-policymaking positions also re-
ceive benefits; for example, police officers commonly receive free
food from restaurants while on duty.9 9 These practices are wide-
If Congress wanted to reach the acceptance of all gifts and gratuities by state and
local officials, the simplest way would have been to pass a bribery statute with jurisdiction
based on interference with interstate commerce in even the slightest way. In fact, it is prob-
ably the jurisdictional limitations of the current federal bribery statute, The Travel Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1952 (1982), which prompted federal prosecutors to use the Hobbs Act for prosecu-
tions of state and local officials. See supra text accompanying note 25.
Furthermore, the fact that Congress intended the Hobbs Act to reach all interferences
with interstate commerce provides no reason to resolve the statute's ambiguity automati-
cally in favor of the prosecution. The congressional intent evidenced by use of the common
law definition of the offense should control. See supra notes 16, 78-86 and accompanying
text.
'5 See Stern, supra note 18, at 6.
9' See United States v. O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 694 (2d Cir. 1984) (Pierce, J., concur-
ring); infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (discussing pattern of receipt giving rise to
an inference of inducement).
" This is a major theme of the O'Grady decision. See 742 F.2d at 693-94; supra notes
54-56 and accompanying text.
S8 O'Grady, 742 F.2d at 693.
99 The example usually employed to illustrate the possible application of the Hobbs Act
to the recipt of small gratuities is the tradition of giving a Christmas tip to mail carriers.
See, e.g., United States v. Campo, 605 F. Supp. 886, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). However, since
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spread and involve substantial sums, but they enjoy general
acceptance. 100
Interpreting the Hobbs Act so that inducement need not be
proven would create vast potential for the selective prosecution of
public servants for accepting even inconsequential or customary
gifts. As for the argument that reasonable prosecutorial discretion
will prevent abuse,10 there are two replies. First, the prosecution
of public officials can be a tempting undertaking for federal prose-
cutors bent on establishing a reputation or gaining publicity.102
Second, the ability to embroil a public official in criminal charges,
even on trivial matters, can be a potent political weapon. These
incentives to misuse such a broad range of discretion give good rea-
son to curtail that discretion by interpreting the Act to require
inducement. 0 3
postal employees work for the federal government, prosecutions would be brought under 18
U.S.C. § 201 (1982), instead of the Hobbs Act. Interestingly, 18 U.S.C. § 201(g) (1982),
which forbids the receipt of all gratuities by federal employees, appears to proscribe the
traditional Christmas tip. See J. NOONAN, supra note 14, at 698.
100 See O'Grady, 742 F.2d at 693. The Model Penal Code states:
Payment to a public servant to induce performance of a non-discretionary act that he
has a duty to perform without compensation ... is widespread ... and in many
quarters it is tolerated quite openly. This suggests that community standards of behav-
ior have not yet crystallized sufficiently to warrant imposition of criminal penalties for
such behavior .... Accordingly, the primary means of controlling such conduct
should be disciplinary action within the civil service.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1, at 35-36 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980).
101 See O'Grady, 742 F.2d at 694 (discussing the government's position).
102 Indeed, a federal prosecutor might be encouraged to prosecute after examining the
careers of past U.S. Attorneys who have successfully used the Hobbs Act to prosecute cor-
rupt officials. Some examples include James Thompson, now governor of Illinois; Richard
Thornburgh, now governor of Pennsylvania; and Herbert Stem, now a federal district judge
in New Jersey.
103 A separate but related issue concerning prosecutorial discretion under the extortion
proscription of the Hobbs Act involves the possibility of prosecutions for extortion of cam-
paign contributions. Extortion of contributions under color of official right has been held to
be within the reach of the Hobbs Act. See United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531, 537 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943, (1982); United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 418-19 (3d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980); United States v. Trotta, 525 F.2d 1096 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976). With or without the requirement that a public
official induce payments to be convicted of extortion under color of official right, much
traditional political fundraising would appear to fall within the Hobbs Act extortion
proscription.
Both judges and commentators have expressed concern over the application of the
Hobbs Act to traditional political fundraising. See United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d 778,
783 (4th Cir.) (the Hobbs Act "could arguably prohibit a public official from personally
soliciting a campaign contribution"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 829 (1982); Cerilli, 603 F.2d at
437 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (referring to the possible application of the Act to political
fundraising and expressing fear of a Hobbs Act "run rampant"); Ruff, supra note 1, at 1196.
Two courts have rejected vagueness challenges to the Hobbs Act's application to political
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B. Fashioning a Standard of Inducement: A Proposal
The previous section has shown that the Hobbs Act should be
read as prohibiting only extortion that involves an act of induce-
ment. The Act and its history, however, are silent about what
kinds of acts constitute inducement. Hence the question: on what
evidence may a jury infer that an official has induced payments in
violation of the Act?
The purposes of the Hobbs Act are best served if inducement
is defined as a communicative act or course of action intended to
encourage a consensual transfer of property to the public official.
The inducement may take the form of an explicit request, demand,
ultimatum, or offer to perform a quid pro quo. Or, the inducement
may be more subtle, in the form of statements or nonverbal ex-
pressions that implicitly request payment, as long as the public of-
ficial's actions send a message encouraging payment.
A pattern of receiving payments also might constitute an act
of implicit inducement. A pattern of receipt can send a clear mes-
sage of expectation to prospective payors.10 4 This communicative
effect is confirmed by observers of political corruption. 105 Thus, if a
public official accepted payments on three occasions, and the re-
ceipt of those payments was known to parties dealing with the
public official, the jury would be allowed to determine that the offi-
cial was inducing payments by a pattern of receipt. However, the
inference of inducement from a pattern of receiving payments
should be permissible and not mandatory. Circumstances might in-
dicate that the pattern of receipt did not amount to a communica-
tive act; a jury could then conclude that an official did not intend
to send a message to prospective payors. A jury might also find
fundraising in cases involving explicit quid pro quo and coercive demands. See Dozier, 672
F.2d at 536-40; Cerilli, 603 F.2d at 419-21. Current Justice Department policy calls for pros-
ecution only in cases where campaign contributions are extorted by coercion or by "a spe-
cific, identifiable quid pro quo." UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 71, § 9-
131.180 (italics in original). Thus, prosecutorial discretion is currently being exercised so as
to avoid the application of the Hobbs Act extortion proscription to legitimate political fun-
draising activities. For a similar analysis concerning prosecutorial discretion and the prose-
cution of political fundraising under bribery laws, see J. NOONAN, supra note 14, at 650-51.
104 See O'Grady, 742 F.2d at 694 (Pierce, J., concurring); United States v. Campo, 605
F. Supp. 886, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Although three judges concurred in O'Grady in the pat-
tern-of-receipt theory solely to create a majority on the issue, they gave no reasons for re-
jecting the theory. See 742 F.2d at 695 (Newman, J., concurring).
105 See supra note 20; cf. W. REISMAN, supra note 19, at 38 ("[I]t becomes clear that
persistent patterns of bribery are part of a larger process in which the bribe recipient,
though appearing passive, is, over time, an active participant. If not the active stimulator of
a specific bribe transaction, he is the creator or sustainer of an effective political structure
that maintains needs and incentives for bribe payments.").
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that no inducement has occurred in situations where the benefits
received were minimal or simply customary.
The proper standard of inducement should also provide that
the public official need not have initiated the transaction or con-
ceived the scheme of payment.106 To require that the transaction
begin with the official would result in acquittals as long as "the
idea for the gift ... originated in the mind of the giver."'01 7 It
would create a significant evidentiary burden on the prosecution,
closely akin to the burden imposed by the theory that extortion
and bribery are mutually exclusive. 08 In contrast, requiring in-
ducement but not initiation by the public official brings the offense
in line with the wording of the statute and the historical nature of
the offense without unduly hindering effective prosecutions.
CONCLUSION
In order to convict a public official of extortion under color of
official right under the Hobbs Act, the prosecution should have to
prove that the official has committed an act inducing a payment
not due him. The requirement of an act of inducement is justified
by the language of the statute, by congressional intent as reflected
in the choice of the common law definition for the wording of the
extortion proscription, by the practice of interpreting criminal
statutes to promote fair notice, and by the desirability of limiting
prosecutorial discretion where there are both special incentives and
ample opportunity for abuse.
The purposes of the Hobbs Act are best served by defining
inducement as a communicative act by an official that is intended
to encourage consensual transfer of property to the official. This
definition allows inducement to be inferred from a pattern of re-
ceiving payments. Inducement should not, however, carry the re-
quirement that the public official initiate the transaction.
James P. Fleissner
10' This conflicts with the court's position in O'Grady, 742 F.2d at 691 (extortion must
begin with the official, not with the gratuitous action of another).
107 Id. at 696 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring and dissenting).
108 See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
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